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This paper studies the possibility of using auctions as a policy instrument in conservation 
programs. In particular, it provides insight into the main concerns that need to be dealt with 
when implementing conservation auctions. To show the cost saving potential of this policy 
instrument, we also calculate the social welfare improvement that can be obtained for an 
afforestation project in Flanders.  
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1.  Introduction 
Over recent years agro-environmental policy issues have become increasingly important. As 
mentioned by Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge (2003), on the one hand, this is due to the increase 
of the marginal value of environmental goods compared with the marginal value of food and 
fibre. Consumers and governments put progressively more emphasis on the environmental 
characteristics of agricultural production, such as landscape values and carbon sequestration. 
As a result, they are more and more willing to pay for environmental quality improvements on 
farmland. On the other hand, general environmental quality has simultaneously declined and 
the supply of environmental goods, for instance biodiversity, has become scarcer. 
Currently the European Union employs fixed-price, or uniform subsidy, schemes to promote 
biodiversity conservation, such as the afforestation of agricultural land (EU Council 
regulation n° 1257/99). However, auctions are a noteworthy alternative. They can and have 
been used to address several different land-related management problems, such as soil 
erosion, dryland salinity, flood management and afforestation. 
Auctions are a method frequently used in procuring commodities for which there are no well-
established markets. As Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) put it ‘auctions are 
the main quasi-market institution used to arrange the provision of public-type goods by 
private enterprises’. Auctions are of particular interest to conservation contracting for at least 
two reasons. First, the item being traded, the provision of environmental services, is a public-
type non-market good which has no standard value. For this reason there can be substantial 
uncertainty about the value, benefits and importance of the environmental characteristics 
associated with a particular type of land use. Second, land conservation issues typically 
concern private land and informational asymmetries are visibly present. Landowners know 
the costs associated with afforestation or other conservation measures and their impact on   3
profits and production, whereas the government often has a higher knowledge of the 
ecological benefits associated with the environmental assets that exist on farmland. The 
government can indeed employ experts in several scientific fields (such as auction design), 
has greater data availability and can include interactions and externalities in its policy 
judgments. 
Auctions in this respect enable the participants to deal with the uncertainty about the object 
being sold or purchased. Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) show in their study 
that the benefits of using auctions as an environmental policy instrument increase if there is 
less information available to the regulator. However, the less information the government 
possesses, the higher the information rents that are assigned to farmers. 
This paper studies the possibility of using auctions as a policy instrument in conservation 
programs. In particular, it provides insight into the main concerns that need to be dealt with 
when implementing conservation auctions. To show the cost saving potential of this policy 
instrument, we also calculate the social welfare improvement that can be obtained for an 
afforestation project in Flanders (Belgium). 
 
2.  Theoretical insights 
An auction is a market-based mechanism that provides buyers and sellers with a forum for the 
trade of goods and services within a predefined framework of guidelines. If these auction 
rules are well designed, the allocation of the traded good can be efficient. Auctions attain 
allocative efficiency under the following two conditions: resources are allocated to bidders 
with the highest valuations and bidders’ valuations reflect the social values of resources (that 
is, their returns when used for production in competitive end markets). Auctions are generally 
used by the seller or auctioneer to sell one or more goods (e.g. paintings or tulip bulbs) to the 
bidder who values the good most.   4
In this section we provide a background to basic auction theory, with particular attention to 
the use of auctions in conservation programs. 
 
2.1 Auctions 
Four types of auctions are widely used and analysed (Klemperer, 1999). Firstly, in the 
ascending auction (the open, oral or English auction), the price is successively raised until 
only one bidder remains and that bidder wins the object at the final, highest, price. Secondly, 
the descending auction (Dutch auction) works in exactly the opposite way: the auctioneer 
starts at a very high price and then gradually lowers the price. The first bidder who calls that 
he will accept the current price wins the object at that price. Thirdly, in the first-price, sealed-
bid auction each bidder independently submits a single bid, without seeing others’ bids, and 
the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid. The winner pays his bid. Finally, in 
the second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey auction), also, each bidder independently 
submits a single bid, without seeing others’ bids, and the object is sold to the bidder who 
makes the highest bid. However, the price he pays is the second-highest bidder’s bid, or 
‘second price’.  
It can be shown that under the same set of basic assumptions each auction form, on average, 
yields the same revenue to the auctioneer. This is known as the Revenue Equivalence 
Theorem (Vickrey, 1961, Myerson, 1981 and Riley and Samuelson, 1981). This theorem 
depends on five crucial assumptions, which we will discuss more thoroughly in section 2.2.1.  
Early work on auctions stems from the seminal papers of Friedman (1956) for the case of a 
single strategic bidder, and Vickrey (1961) for the equilibrium game theoretical approach. 
Survey articles that offer an insight in the theoretical literature on auctions are, for example, 
McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Klemperer (1999 and 2002). 
   5
2.2 Conservation auctions 
Auctions can also be used to allocate conservation contracts. However, in this setting, the 
roles of bidders and auctioneers are quite different from their parts in ‘classic’ auctions. The 
bidders now offer to change their land use and management practices and their bids indicate 
the minimal amount (subsidy) they require as compensation for this alteration. It is important 
to note that the winning bidders, i.e. the participants in the program, remain the sole owners of 
their land. The objective of the auctioneers is now either to minimise the amount spent in 
order to reach a specified conservation objective or to maximise the conservation value of the 
awarded contracts within a given budget.  
Auctions designed to grant contracts for conservation typically involve multiple identical 
contracts. Land ownership is, after all, often in private hands and fragmented. This is called a 
multiple item auction, as opposed to a single-unit one. For multiple contracts a discriminatory 
first-price sealed-bid auction can be used. This implies that bidders are not judged solely on 
the level of their bid but also on the quality of the conservation contract they propose. After 
correcting for the conservation value offered, the n lowest bidders are rewarded and receive 
the payment stated in their bids. In the case with no budget constraints, optimal auction design 
requires the use of a reserve price (i.e. a maximum acceptable bid or bid cap) to induce 
farmers to reveal their bids truthfully (Myerson, 1981).  
Subsequently we discuss whether the revenue equivalence theorem is applicable to 
conservation auctions, what the optimal bidding rules might look like and what the 
implications of repeated conservation auctions are. 
 
2.2.1 Revenue equivalence theorem   6
The revenue equivalence theorem states that each auction form, on average, yields the same 
revenue to the auctioneer under the set of the following five crucial assumptions (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987):  
i)  bidders are risk neutral,  
ii)  bidders have independent private values,  
iii)  bidders are symmetric,  
iv)  payment is a function of bids alone and  
v)  zero transaction costs associated with bidding and participating in the auction.  
As Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) note, the revenue equivalence theorem is 
not likely to hold for conservation contracts and we comment briefly on the five assumptions. 
Firstly, in general, farmers are assumed to be risk averse and to prefer certain outcomes to 
uncertain ones with the same expected payoff. However, according to Latacz-Lohmann and 
Van der Hamsvoort (1997) empirical studies assessing farmers’ conservation attitudes in this 
respect do not arrive at a unanimous judgment. Still, the assumption of risk aversion has its 
implications on the selection of the auction format. With risk averse bidders, the first-price 
sealed-bid auction produces higher revenues to the auctioneer than the English auction (Riley 
and Samuelson, 1981). In the case of conservation contracting, risk aversion therefore leads to 
a higher level of cost effectiveness. Risk averse bidders will require a lower compensation 
payment from the program than risk neutral bidders, since the conservation payment provides 
them with a unchanging element in their income. After all, farmers’ uncertainty decreases 
with the inclusion of a nonstochastic income component and thus this induces them to 
marginally decrease their bids in order to increase the probability of acceptance. 
Next, in a conservation setting one can assume that bidders have independent private values, 
i.e. farmers know how the contract would affect their profits. The bid they submit is 
independent of the value other farmers place on their land. However, practical applications   7
have shown that a common-value element can arise when the conservation contracts are sold 
in sequential auctions (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997).  
Thirdly, since the quality of the land and thus the environmental services can differ between 
farmers, we have an asymmetric bidding situation. Each farmer draws their bid from different 
probability functions. Practically this can be solved by discriminating between bids or by 
using eligibility criteria. Bidders will be judged both by their monetary bid and by the quality 
of the environmental services they will provide. 
Further, the conservation payment may be a function of bids alone. Alternatively, part of the 
payments can be made when the contracts are assigned and the rest can be paid at the end of 
the program depending on the environmental outcomes. 
Finally, since information costs can be important for the bidders and influence their bidding 
behaviour, it is important to promote the clarity and simplicity of contracts and bidding 
process. Farmers will, after all, need to collect information about which conservation actions 
are possible on their land and the costs associated with them, about the workings of the 
auction and about the administrative requirements for the contract.  
 
2.2.2 Optimal bidding 
When analysing auction schemes, it is important to know which factors influence the bidding 
behaviour of the participants. Two studies are particularly worth mentioning here: Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) investigate the optimal bid for a uniform 
distribution of the farmers’ beliefs on program acceptance and Vukina et al. (2003) look at 
more general distributions. The optimal bidding contract is investigated when farmers are risk 
neutral and there are two criteria to determine winners: a monetary bid and an environmental 
score.   8
According to Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) and Vukina et al. (2003) the 
optimal bid 
*
i b  for farmer i is the one that maximises the expected benefit of participation 
over and above the benefits from farming, and is found by maximising 
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ii ii i bb YY F b π =+ − −    with respect to the submitted bid bi. Net income from 
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unknown largest possible bid farmer i can submit and still win acceptance into the 





i Fb fud u =∫ = cumulative density function of f . 
Here  f summarises the entire farmer’s uncertainty, which includes ignorance of the rules 
judging the environmental services provided by the offered contract, the lack of knowledge on 
the evaluation rules combining scores and bids, as well as other bidders’ strategies and scores. 
The formula for the optimal bid indicates that bidders increase their bids above the net cost of 









. This mark-up can be thought of as the 
farmers’ information rent earned as a result of their private information about the opportunity 
cost of program participation. Bidders balance their net payoffs with the probability of 
acceptance.   9
 
2.2.3 Dynamic setting 
In reality conservation auctions often involve multiple rounds, in each of which several 
conservation contracts are awarded. This adds a dynamic dimension to the study of auction 
schemes. Hailu et al. (2004), for example, examine repeated procurement auctions that are 
target-constrained and that aim to reach a particular conservation target rather than to spend a 
predefined budget. They show that for a single-unit discriminatory sealed-bid auction, the 
optimal bidding strategy is one of overbidding and that this overbidding declines when the 
number of bidders increases. The more general result for a multiple item auction shows that 
the level of overbidding is high for low-value bidders. Overbidding decreases as the value 
increases, with the bids from high-value bidders asymptotically approaching their respective 
private values. This implies that the extraction of rents under auctions can be similar to that 
under fixed-price schemes. It also implies that the current expectations about the performance 
of auctions relative to fixed-price schemes need to be reassessed. 
 
3.  Implementation issues and guidelines 
The theoretical and empirical research on the potential of auction schemes for nature 
conservation allows us to identify policy objectives and to formulate guidelines that warrant 
consideration when designing and implementing conservation auctions. We have singled out 
for discussion eight relevant topics concerning the design and realisation of nature 
conservation auctions. 
 
3.1 Program objectives 
The correct specification of the objectives targeted by the program’s directors is critical 
(Reichelderfer and Bogges, 1988). It is also important to consider the interaction with other   10
programs or regulations; see, for example, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
As Latacz-Lohmann and Hodge (2003) note, cross compliance is an interesting notion in this 
respect. Farmers who do not comply with environmental guidelines could risk foregoing 
payments from EU income support schemes. They specifically propose the use of competitive 
bidding in the development of a green-CAP. 
 
3.2 Single round versus repeated auctions 
A single auction round is better if landowners have independent private values (Stoneham et 
al., 2002). Repeated auctions can, after all, endanger the efficiency properties of conservation 
auctions (Hailu et al., 2004 and Hailu and Schilizzi, 2003). The farmers’ learning process can 
increase their information rents and, as Shoemaker (1989) has pointed out, bids can approach 
the bid cap if farmers are risk averse and if they obtain more information over time. 
 
3.3 Sealed-bid  
Klemperer (2002) notes that a sealed-bid approach is less susceptible to collusion between 
bidders than repeated open, ascending and uniform-price auctions. Sealed-bid auctions are 
also preferable if bidders are risk-averse. A first-price sealed-bid auction will facilitate lower 
bids because landholders can reduce their own commodity and weather related income 
variability by adding a regular income stream from conservation payments. 
 
3.4 Reserve price 
As Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981) have noted reserve prices are less 
important when the budget is constrained. If the government envisions only a single auction 
round with a budget constraint, it is not necessary to set a reserve price, i.e. a maximum 
allowable bid or bid cap. If the program consists of several auctions rounds over different   11
regions or periods, it is important to include a reserve price. The reserve price allows transfers 
between auctions in order to maximise total biodiversity outcomes (Stoneham et al, 2003).  
Shoemaker (1989) has argued that asymmetric information about farmer risk aversion and the 
possibility of farmers learning the bid cap can cause bids to approach the bid cap. The 
maximum allowable bid (cap) for the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is, for 
example, equal to the average land rental rate for each soil type in the county where the 
proposed CRP land is located, plus a $5 per acre maintenance allowance (Vukina et al., 2003). 
In order to deter farmers from learning the bid cap, it might be advisable to use a more 
complicated definition of the bid cap or one that is altered annually rather than the land rental 
rate. Moreover, while this bid cap is meant to measure the opportunity cost of land, in fact it 
simply sets an upper bound for land values among farmers who participate in the auction. 
 
3.5 Discriminatory price versus fixed-price auctions 
One of the first studies about the efficiency o f auctions is Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort’s (1997). In a simulation exercise they show that auction schemes are more 
efficient than a fixed-rate offer (i.e. a uniform subsidy scheme). Under all bidding scenarios 
considered, more of the program goals were achieved with the same amount of money. The 
reasons for these efficiency gains are twofold. First, the difference between payments and 
costs accruing to farmers who enrol land with lower-than-average opportunity costs are 
reduced. Second, producers with opportunity costs above the level of the fixed-rate payment 
are encouraged to tender cost-covering bids. These farmers would not participate under the 
offer or subsidy system.  
Discriminatory price auctions involve lower costs for the same outcome as fixed-price 
policies if they are truth revealing. Cason and Gangadharan (2004) show in an experiment that   12
a discriminatory pricing scheme is superior to a uniform scheme since its overall market 
performance is better.  
Hailu and Schilizzi (2004), on the other hand, caution against too much optimism in the 
setting of repeated auctions. They use simulation results to show that, in a dynamic setting 
where bidders can learn, the auction mechanism is not superior to fixed-price schemes except 
when the latter involve the use of high uniform subsidy levels. 
 
3.6 Collusion 
Bidders collude in an auction if they coordinate their bids and allow one bidder to win the 
traded good at a price substantially below what other colluding bidders are willing to pay 
(Chan et al., 2003). Bidders can collude in an implicit or explicit way. Collusion does not 
have to imply an illegal arrangement. It is more likely to arise in repeated auctions than in 
one-off, single-bid auctions. Recurrent interaction between bidders adds to the attractiveness 
and feasibility of collusive strategies. McAfee and McMillan (1992) have investigated the 
possibility for all bidders to collude in a first-price sealed-bid auction. 
In order to prevent possible collusion, the seller should set specific auction rules to avert bid 
coordination between bidders. Auction rules should be devised to enable individual bidders to 
gain from non-cooperative bidding strategies (i.e. cheating on the agreement to collude) 
without being detected or sanctioned by the other bidders. Chan et al. (2003) suggest the 
following design features to reduce collusive bidding. 
-  The higher the reserve price, the larger the number of potentially colluding bidders. 
Also, a high reserve price limits the potential gain from collusion. In repeated auctions 
the mere threat of a high reserve price can already deter collusion. 
-  Keep the reserve price a secret. Potential colluders need to know the reserve price in 
order to determine their collusive bids.    13
-  Announce only the identity of the winner, not the winning bid or losing bids and adopt 
a secret allocation rule that does not depend on the highest bid. This reduces the 
colluders’ ability to detect deviating behaviour. 
-  Choose a sealed-bid auction over an open auction. This postpones the punishment of 
cheaters to the future. 
 
3.7 Contract design 
Since the conservation benefits differ from site to site, it is best to use individual management 
agreements. It is also interesting to incorporate progress payments (Stoneham et al., 2002), 
since this provides the government with an easy sanction in case of non-performance, i.e. 
funds can be withdrawn.  
In conservation programs the relation between actions and outcomes does not always exist, is 
site-specific and depends on non-measurable factors (Reichelfelder and Bogges, 1988). 
Biodiversity is difficult to measure, so the resulting environmental services are hard to assess. 
This forces the government to base the contracts on inputs rather than outputs, e.g. the type of 
tree planted or the presence of undergrowth. This has its implications for risk bearing: the risk 
of not obtaining the desired outcome due to unforeseen circumstances is shifted from 
landowners to government.  
Vukina et al. (2003) show that including the farmers’ own environmental benefits into the 
evaluation formula can distort bidders’ incentives. Including these benefits compensates 
farmers for actions they would have taken anyway. Moreover, farmers can have a hold-up 
position if they know that the environmental score associated with their plot is high and that 
the environmental services provided are highly desirable or even unique. Stoneham et al. 
(2002) and Cason and Gangadharan (2004) argue that if landowners do not know the exact 
value of the environmental benefits associated with their land, the auction’s cost effectiveness   14
is improved. For this reason, it may be desirable to change the weighting of multiple 
objectives each year. This will reduce the information leakage. Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort (1997) also suggest concealing the functional form of the bid acceptance 
mechanism while at the same time providing new bidders with guidelines as to the range of 
realistic payment levels. 
 
3.8 Implementation 
To attract as many bidders as possible, it is important to make sure that there is enough 
publicity about the conservation program. Possible strategies are the distribution of brochures, 
development of websites, designating a fixed contact person, organising local information 
meetings and site visits. In BushTender (Australia), for example, field officers visited the 
different sites and helped landowners to fill in the forms and discuss the different 
management options. 
 
4.  Real-life applications 
Conservation auctions take place across the world. This section provides an overview of these 
programs per continent, with a discussion of the most important ones. More details on the 
different programs can be found in appendix A. 
 
4.1 United States of America  
A real-life example is the above-mentioned US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) that 
pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use 
(www.fsa.usda.gov/dapf/cepd/crp.htm). Since its start in 1985, there has been 29 sign-up 
periods and the US CRP’s main aims are to protect the topsoil from erosion and to safeguard 
natural resources. According to the program, a farmer can, if his bid is accepted, receive   15
annual rental payments equal to the value of the submitted bid in exchange for removing the 
land from agricultural production and putting it to a conservation use. In addition to an annual 
per-acre rental payment, the farmer may request a one-time cost-share payment. A typical 
contract period is generally 10 to 15 years. In order to rank bidders, an environmental benefit 
index (EBI), which measures the potential environmental benefit of an offered parcel, is 
combined with the cost factor, which is a function of the bid placed. The algorithm, which 
translates the bid into the cost factor, is unknown to farmers. From 1996 onwards, bidders 
were informed about their EBI, which was previously not communicated to them, and an 
upper limit on acceptable bids was installed. 
Several papers have investigated the Conservation Reserve Program. Firstly, Reichelderfer 
and Bogges (1988) have described the actual and potential cost savings of the program in 
1986. They conclude that CRP’s performance is highly sensitive to the choice of eligibility 
criteria, the bid solicitation and selection process. Next, Shoemaker (1989) has argued that, 
for the CRP, asymmetric information about farmer risk aversion and farmers learning the bid 
cap caused bids to approach the maximum acceptable bid. Finally, Vukina et al. (2003) have 
used data from the CRP auctions to elicit farmers’ attitudes toward the environment. By 
analysing their bids, they found that farmers condition their bids on their environmental score, 
as predicted by theory. Farmers appear to value those environmental benefits that directly 
affect productivity of their land (e.g. reduced soil erosion) but do not value those benefits that 
resemble public goods (e.g. biodiversity). 
Another application of auctions to conservation problems is the Swine Buyout Program in 
North Carolina (www.enr.state.nc.us/DSWC/). This voluntary program removes high-risk 
swine production operations from the 100-year floodplain and reduces potential hazard from 
future floods while keeping the land in agricultural use. The program’s first phase started in   16
1999 and elicited 85 bids from which 22 were accepted. Later auctions took place in 2002 and 
in 2004. 
A further example is the Flint River Drought Protection Irrigation Auction in Georgia 
(www.state.ga.us/dnr/environ/), which pays farmers not to irrigate their cropland for one year. 
Through a voluntary auction, eligible farmers could submit bids via computer for the state to 
purchase their irrigation permits. The need for auctions arose in 2001 and 2002. The program 
was able to enlist 33000 and 40300 acres respectively (approx. 13350 and 16300 ha) by 
paying on average 136 USD (2001) and 128 USD (2002) per acre for the accepted offers. 
Weather conditions improved in subsequent years and further auctions were unnecessary. 
 
4.2 Australia 
BushTender is an auction-based program developed in Australia (www.dse.vic.gov.au/dse/). 
Its main goal is to allocate biodiversity contracts to private landholders. Under this system, 
landholders competitively tender for contracts to improve their native vegetation. Successful 
bids are those that offer best value for money. A survey of landholders in the trial areas has 
indicated that participants and successful bidders are reasonably typical of all landholders 
living in the trial areas. The BushTender approach was also able to support landowners 
already undertaking some management of native vegetation as well as those landowners that 
did not previously participate in other government incentive schemes.  
Two trial auctions were executed at the beginning of the BushTender program: the North 
East/ North Central trial (2001) and the BushTender trial Gippsland (2002).  These were 
single-round, discriminatory, sealed-bid auctions. As a result, 3200 ha and 1684 ha of 
farmland respectively were enlisted in the program at acceptance rates of 65.5% (2001) and 
45% (2002). Currently several projects, such as PlainsTender and EcoTender, are 
implemented under BushTender program.    17
Stoneham et al. (2003) focus on the implementation and the key design features of the 
BushTender trial auctions. The authors have analysed the bids submitted by landholders and 
have calculated that a price discriminating auction would reduce the cost of achieving the 
same biodiversity improvement using a fixed-price approach by seven times. Moreover, when 
truthful revelation of the farmers’ opportunity costs is assumed, the price discriminatory 
auction and the fixed-price or uniform subsidy scheme have the same efficiency properties.  
Besides the BushTender program, several other Australian conservation programs have 
included auctions as a policy instrument. The Land Management Tender in Liverpool Plains 
(NSW) was a joint trial with WWF Australia. Landscape auctions were used to establish 
landscape corridors in Burdekin-Fitzroy (Queensland) and to counter degradation of 
biodiversity and dryland salinity. A multiple-outcome auction of land-use change in 
Gouldburn-Broken Catchment (Victoria) is being implemented.  
 
4.3 European Union 
In the United Kingdom, the Conservation Sensitive Stewardship Scheme and the Nitrate 
Sensitive Areas Scheme offer a fixed payment to landowners for specified environmental 
actions (www.defra.gov.uk/erdp/). The administration then chooses the bidders that offer the 
best quality management plan. 
In Germany a trial auction took place in Northeim as a co-operation between academic 
researchers and local authorities (Groth, 2005 and Bertke et al., 2004). Every farmer had to 
deliver an individual offer for each plot of grassland. This offer included the choice of the 
ecological good (grassland I, II or III) and the price per hectare. Offered bids ranged from 10 
to 350 Euro per hectare, and a total of 289 hectares of grassland participated in the program. 
In his study, Groth (2005) determines and evaluates the farmers’ transaction costs associated   18
with participation in the grassland auction in Northeim. His follow-up survey suggests that the 
whole process of offer submission took farmers on average four hours. 
 
4.4 General comments on existing auction programs 
All existing programs are fairly recent, with the notable exception of the US Conservation 
Reserve Program. Especially in Australia, bidding schemes are a popular instrument in 
conservation policy and the number of auction schemes is rapidly expanding. Apparently, the 
first impressions of the policy programs are favourable and the regulators are willing to 
increase their use. However, since conservation programs are so recent, a thorough analysis of 
the programs’ results has not yet been performed. Quantifying the efficiency benefits of using 
auction schemes rather than subsidy schemes would be very interesting for further research. 
The high acceptance rate of bids in the existing programs is also noteworthy. On average 55.9 
percent of submitted bids is accepted, with a minimum of 23 percent (US CRP, 1986) and a 
maximum of 83.2 percent (Grassland trial auction, Germany). This might imply that only 
farmers with a high probability of acceptance are submitting bids. 
The theoretical and empirical results discussed previously show that design issues are very 
important when implementing conservation auctions. In practice we see that long established 
programs, such as CRP, tend to change and adapt the auction rules over the years in order to 
deal with observed problems. Typically, regulators also tend to finance a trial auction with a 
limited budget in order to gain some familiarity with the impact and working of auctions for 
nature conservation. 
 
5.  Exercise: afforestation in Flanders 
To show the potential of auctions, we will perform an exercise for an afforestation project in 
Flanders and calculate the gain from using a bidding mechanism in an ideal setting. For this   19
purpose we assume that the auction is truth revealing and that there is complete participation 
of the targeted landowners. The exercise will therefore provide an upper limit on the possible 
gains from using auctions rather than the actual achievable gain. 
 
5.1 Description of the case study 
The area studied is Wetteren-Aalst, a suburban region in Flanders (Belgium), which currently 
has a low forest index. Ten agricultural sites are marked as potential locations for new forests. 
We assume that the ten sites are each owned by one single farmer and that decisions on land 
use change apply to the site in its entirety. Site characteristics are obviously heterogeneous: 
different types of soil, diverse agricultural uses and different distances to existing forests and 
city centres are considered. More site information can be found in Moons and Rousseau 
(2005). 
The processing of farm manure is included in the model, which implies that the farmers’ 
afforestation decisions cannot be examined independently of each other. For example, if crop 
farmers decide to plant trees on their land, there will be less land available to spread pig 
manure and pig farmers will have to dispose of their manure in another, more costly, way. 
Since crop farmers do not consider this externality when deciding on land use, their decisions 
are not always socially optimal. 
Agrarian land and forests produce not only agricultural products but also benefits such as 
recreation, hunting, carbon sequestration, non-use and ecological values. Recreation values 
are combination dependent since they depend on the number of substitutes in the 
neighbourhood. Appendix B summarises the estimates of the benefits under consideration. 
 
5.2 Auction scheme   20
In our exercise, we consider a discriminatory first-price sealed-bid auction in which farmers 
can ask the amount of subsidies (=bid) they would like to receive to convert their farmland 
into a multifunctional forest. The regulator will not need to set a reserve price since we face 
an area constraint; only combinations with a total surface area between 150 and 200 hectare 
are considered. When all bids are made, the regulator will calculate the optimal cluster of new 
forests using the methodology developed in Moons et al. (2005) and accept the bids of all 
landowners that belong to that optimal combination. The farmers do not know in advance the 
outcome of this optimisation exercise and assume, for this reason, that the probability 
distribution of winning the auction is equal for all participants. Calculating the optimal 
location of new forests implies that the government knows the costs and benefits of forestry 
and agriculture for the different farmers.  
The optimal combination of new forests, which maximises the total net social benefits of the 
afforestation project, consists of sites 1, 2, 9 and 10. The methodology, explained in detail in 
Moons et al. (2005) and Moons and Rousseau (2005), takes the social benefit for all possible 
combinations of the potential forest sites into account, with a total surface area between 150 
and 200 ha. Sites 1, 9 and 10 are currently used for crop farming, whereas site 2 is used for 
grazing (see table 1). Site 2 is the largest in terms of surface area (64 ha), while site 9 
measures only 22 ha. Population density around sites 1 and 2 is higher than the average for 
Flanders (approx. 400 inhabitants per km²), sites 9 and 10 are situated in far less densely 
populated areas.  
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5.3 Comparison of policy scenarios   21
Let us now compare the current Flemish afforestation policy with the optimal command-and-
control (CAC) policy and an auction scheme. First we apply the current Flemish uniform 
subsidy scheme to our benchmark and observe which farmers will participate. If the current 
subsidy scheme with an annualised subsidy of 765 Euro/ha for planting a multifunctional 
forest is imposed, then farmers 1, 9 and 10 decide to plant forests. Social welfare increases by 
881 968 Euro compared to a situation without afforestation policy (see figure 1). The optimal 
CAC policy and the auction scheme, which both ensure that the new cluster of forests is 
planted at its optimal location, additionally increase social welfare by 220 102 Euro, i.e. 25 
percent. However, in a democratic country the dictatorial CAC solution, i.e. forcing the 
landowners of the optimal sites to plant forest, is not a realistic option. Therefore, it is 
interesting to look at the potential advantage of using auctions. 
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In order to identify the differences between the different policy scenarios, the components of 
social welfare are studied more closely in table 2. The current subsidy amount induces only 
three (out of ten) farmers to plant forests while the auction policy involves four landowners. 
Surprisingly the optimal location of forests has a slightly lower recreational value to Flemish 
consumers than the present policy. However, the increase in non-use, ecological and carbon 
sequestration benefits compensates for the loss in recreational value under the optimal policy. 
Total net farmers’ income is always negative due to the externalities caused by the manure 
disposition. Government income is positive under the auction scheme since the budget spent 
on afforestation projects is compensated by the decrease in agricultural subsidies that have to 
be paid. 
   22
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 
 
In this illustration, the auction could be designed perfectly and all necessary information 
could be obtained without costs by the government. For this reason, the comparison between 
the different policy schemes has taken place in an ideal setting and was not entirely realistic. 
Nonetheless, the gains from using an auction scheme rather than the existing uniform subsidy 
are obvious. Auctions, as an environmental policy instrument, allow the regulator to obtain 
the optimal solution, whereas a uniform subsidy could not if there are no objective criteria to 
condition the subsidy on (Moons and Rousseau, 2005). 
 
6.  Conclusions 
When developing conservation policies, it is worthwhile to consider auctions as an alternative 
to fixed-offer (uniform subsidy) schemes. The potential cost savings can be considerable even 
though the auction’s design characteristics and specifications are not straightforward and 
should be tailored to each individual program. The expanding use of auctions in conservation 
programs over recent years indicates regulators’ growing interest in this policy instrument as 
well as its potential as a cost saving device. 
Several design issues need to be addressed before implementing a conservation auction. The 
attitude towards sharing information on environmental benefits with participants should be 
determined, since this has important implications on the level and range of bids offered as 
well as on the possibility of collusion between bidders. The necessity and the level of a 
reserve price depend on the constraints embedded in the program and on the number of 
auction rounds planned. As was demonstrated in the BushTender auctions in Australia and the 
grassland auction in Germany, the collaboration of scientific experts on auction theory and 
administrations can be helpful and should be considered.    23
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Appendix B: Estimates of costs and benefits 
 
The amounts are expressed in Euro per hectare per year. 
 
 Agriculture  Multifunctional  forest 
Benefits 
Net agricultural income   
Crop farms:   646 
Pig farms:      549 
Grazer farms: 473 
Combination dependent 
Crop farms: [ ] 364,646 −  
Pig farms: [ ] 4738,549 −  
Grazer farms: [ ] 1259,473 −  
Timber 0  5 
Hunting 7.69  15.38 
Carbon uptake  0  68.8 
Recreation value  Combination dependent 
Average value per site belongs to 
[ ] 314,2268  








Planting and management  0  24.16 
 
These estimates are based on Moons and Rousseau (2005).   31
 Table 1: characteristics of the optimal combination 
Number of substitute 
forests within _km distance 









in 15 km 
zone  2 2-5  5-10  10-15 
Current 
Land Use 
















9  22 Sand-
Loam 







10  49 Sand-
Loam 







   32
Table 2: Comparison between current subsidy and optimal CAC policy 






Forested area (in ha)  118  182  182 
Number of forests  3 
(1, 9 and 10) 
4 
(1,2,9 and 10) 
4 
(1,2,9 and 10) 
Type of forests  Multifunctional  Multifunctional  Multifunctional
Net farmers’ income (euro)  -13 716  -162 209  -26 167 
Government revenue (euro)  -47 267  67 118  68 924 
Net recreational value (euro)  473 221  472 663  472 663 
Net non-use value + net 
ecological value + net carbon 
sequestration (euro) 
469 729  724 498  724 498 
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Figure 1: Comparison between policy scenarios 





Net social benefit (in thousand Euro) Forested area (in ha)
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